The First Amendment as a Restraint on the Power of Congress to Investigate by Summers, Marvin
Marquette Law Review
Volume 43
Issue 4 Spring 1960 Article 4
The First Amendment as a Restraint on the Power
of Congress to Investigate
Marvin Summers
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Marvin Summers, The First Amendment as a Restraint on the Power of Congress to Investigate, 43 Marq. L. Rev. 459 (1960).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol43/iss4/4
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A
RESTRAINT ON THE POWER OF
CONGRESS TO INVESTIGATE
MARVIN SUMMERS*
One of the vexing problems in the realm of public law relates to
the charge by witnesses that their rights under the Constitution have
been violated by legislative investigations. This problem poses a con-
flict in values which, taken separately, are prized, but which stand,
nevertheless, in a competitive relationship to one another. That it is
necessary and desirable for Congress and state legislatures to exercise
the power of inquiry is not seriously questioned, yet the rights of wit-
nesses must be determined and secured lest legislative investigations
become a travesty on the concept of limited government.
In a classic sense, this conflict might be represented as an expression
of the eternal tension between the authority of the state and individual
liberty. Or, in the terminology of the social sciences, it might be seen
as a clash between the value structures of the various groups that en-
gage in the political process. Through whatever conceptual lenses the
problem is viewed, some sort of acceptable balance must be struck be-
tween the contending forces.
A review of congressional and state legislative investigations leads
this writer to suggest that during most of this post war period the
scales have been tipped in favor of coercive power of legislative bodies.
In the context of the cold war and the anxiety about subversion, the
imbalance was perhaps understandable. Yet granting the imperatives
of national security, many writers1 have questioned whether the general
conduct of these investigations was consistent with the spirit and tradi-
tions of a liberal society.
In June of 1957, the Supreme Court apparently shared those doubts
for it rendered two decisions that appeared to be a calculated attempt
to redress the balance. Watkins v. United States2 and Sweezy v. New
Hampshire3 are important examples of the general effort of the Warren
Court to reemphasize the rights of individuals against encroachments
*Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
1 See: Barth, Government by Investigation (1955); Carr, The House Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1950 (1952) ; Griswold, The Fifth
Amendment Today (1955); Taylor, Grand Inquest: The Story of Congres-
sional Investigations (1955) ; Nutting, Freedom of Silence; Constitutional
Protection Against Government Intrusion on Political Affairs, 47 Mich. L.
Rev. 181 (1948); Elias and Williams, Right of Silence Before Congressional
Investigating Committees-First Amendment Guarantees, 22 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 741 (1954).
2 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
3 Wyman v. Sweezy, 100 N.H. 103, 121 A. 2d 783 (1956); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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by the state in the name of national security. Decisions accompanied
by opinions highly critical of some practices and procedures of legisla-
tive investigations reversed convictions of witnesses for refusing to
respond to inquiries posed under the authority of Congress,4 in one
instance, and a state legislature,5 in the other. In recent decisions,
Barenblatt v. United States6 and Uphaus v. Louis C. Wyman7 the
attitude of the Court seems to have shifted somewhat. Although the
previous rulings were not reversed, the Court did render decisions ad-
verse to witnesses who had, on constitutional grounds, challenged the
investigatory power of legislatures.
Among other complex issues, these cases raised the question of
whether the First Amendment was applicable to congressional investi-
gations and to state legislative inquiries (via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment), and whether rights protected by the First Amendment con-
stituted a limitation on the investigatory power of -legislatures. This
constitutional question had cropped up in previous cases only to be
ignored by the Supreme Court or disposed of adversely by lower
tribunals. Beginning, however, with the 1957 cases, the Court has de-
voted considerable attention to "the collision of the investigatory func-
tion with constitutionally protected rights of speech and assembly.
• ..,,s By way of dictum, the Court has declared that the First Amend-
ment is applicable to legislative inquiries and implied that the Amend-
ment establishes some limitations on the investigatory power.
This article examines some instances where the First Amendment
has been relied upon as justification for refusing to answer legislative
inquiries and traces selected cases through the judiciary with the view
of determining the present state of the law and identifying develop-
mental trends. Some consideration will be given both to the theoretical
basis for an appeal to the First Amendment and to the problems raised
by such a plea.
4 See H.R. 534, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. for action of the House of Representatives
in which the Speaker was directed to submit a report of the Committee on
Un-American Activities to the Attorney General for criminal action.
5 In 1953, the Legislature of New Hampshire adopted a resolution authorizing
the attorney general of the state to "make full and complete investigation with
respect to violations of the subversive activities act of 1951 and to determine
whether subversive persons as defined in said act are presently located within
this state." The Attorney general was also directed to proceed with criminal
prosecutions under the subversive activities act whenever evidence presented
to him in the course of the investigation indicates violation thereof, and he
shall report to the 1955 session on the first day of its regular session the
results of his investigation, together with his recommendations, if any, for
necessary legislation. N.H. Laws 1953, ch 307. The authorization was ex-
tended two years by N.H. Laws 1955, chs. 197, 340.
6 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).7 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
8 sJustice Brennan noted that "Judicial consideration of the collision of the
investigatory function with constitutionally protected rights of speech and as-
sembly is a recent development in our constitutional law." Uphaus v. Wyman,
supra note 7.
[Vol. 43
FIRST AMENDMENT
The considerable body of literature9 on the power of Congress to
investigate and to punish for contempt requires only brief review.
Neither the investigatory nor the contempt authority of Congress is
conferred specifically by the Constitution. The contempt power is
thought to reside inherently in Congress as it does in a judicial body,
and in an early case,10 the Supreme Court sustained the House of Rep-
resentatives in contempt proceedings against a non-member for at-
tempted bribery of a legislator. The Court ruled that Congress had an
inherent right to protect the legislative process from corrupting in-
fluences."
On the other hand, the power to investigate is implied from one or
more of the legislative grants expressly delegated by the Constitution."
Thus, Congress may use its investigatory power in connection with
regulating interstate commerce, raising an army, levying taxes, and the
like. In 1857, Congress correlated its contempt and investigatory pow-
ers by authorizing contempt citations for persons who failed to respond
to a summons from either House or who refused to answer a ques-
tion pertinent to a valid inquiry."
The first challenge to the investigatory power of Congress was.
9 Barth, supra note 1; Carr, Constitutional Liberty and Congressional Investiga-
tions, in Kelly, Foundations of Freedom in the American Constitution (1958) ;
Dimock, Congressional Investigating Committees (1929); Eberling, Congres-
sional Investigations (1928); Griswold, supra note 1; McGeary, The Devel-
opment of Congressional Investigative Power (1940); Ogden, The Dies
Committee (1943) ; Taylor, supra note 1; Landis, Constitutional Limitations on
the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153 (1926);
Wigmore, Legislative Power to Compel Testimonial Disclosure, 19 Ill. L.
Rev. 452 (1924); Lashley, The Investigating Power of Congress; Its Scope
and Limitations, 40 A.B.A. J. 537 (1929); Coudert, Congressional Inquisition
v. Individual Liberty, 15 Va. L. Rev. 537 (1929); Morgan, Congressional
Investigations and Judicial Review, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 556 (1949); Congres-
sional Investigations: A Symposium, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. (1951).
20 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 204 (1821).11 However, the sanction available to Congress was restricted to imprisonment
that was not to extend beyond the end of the session in which the contemptu-
ous conduct occurred. This limitation was based on the theory that while
Congress had power to prevent conduct that would hinder or obstruct legis-
lation, it could not on its own authority take purely punitive measures against
private persons.
12 "But there is no provision expressly investing either House with power to make
investigators and exact testimony... ." Nevertheless, the court ruled that "the
two Houses of Congress . . . possess not only such powers as are expressly
granted to them by the Constitution, but such auxiliary powers as are neces-
sary and appropriate to make the express powers effective." McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161, 173 (1926).13 The statute, as amended, now reads: "every person who having been sum-
moned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give
testimony or to produce papers upon any matters under inquiry before either
House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution
of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Con-
gress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer
any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than
$100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor
more than twelve months." Rev. Stat. §102, 2 U.S.C. §192.
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brought to the judiciary in 1881. In Kilbourn v. Thompson'4 the Su-
preme Court disallowed the contempt proceedings against Hallet Kil-
bourn and even cast doubt on the authority of either House to compel
private citizens to give testimony pursuant to a purely legislative
function. 5 However, the doubts raised in 1881 were dispelled some
forty years later in McGrain v. Daugherty16 where the Supreme Court
held that "the power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an es-
sential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function," and that
either House "has power, through its own process, to compel a private
individual to appear before it or one of its committees and give testi-
mony needed to enable it efficiently to exercise a legislative function
belonging to it under the Constitution.""' The modern view is that in
order to legislate wisely on the multitude of complex issues that come
before it, Congress must have the means to obtain information far be-
yond that which its individual members would be expected to have.
The investigatory power is not, however, without judicially defined
limitations. In both the Kilbourn and McGrain cases, the Supreme
Court took the position that Congress had no general mandate to con-
duct investigation; consequently, only those inquiries that were related
to a function of the legislature could be justified. 8 Even if the subject
under inquiry were within the competence of Congress, the specific
question the witness refused to answer must also have been pertinent
to the purpose of the investigation before punishment could be in-
flicted under contempt legislation.19
In sum, the broad outlines of the power of Congress to investigate,
14 103 U.S. 168 (1881).15 Justice Miller declared, "Ve are sure that no person can be punished for
contumacy as a witness before either House unless his testimony is required
in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire, and we feel
equally sure that neither of these bodies possesses the general power of
making inquiry into private affairs of the citizen." 103 U.S. 168 at 190. Justice
Miller, who wrote the opinion for the Court in the Kilbourn case, was no
admirer of congressional investigations. Once to a friend he wrote, "I think
the public has been much abused, the time of legislative bodies uselessly
consumed and rights of the citizen ruthlessly invaded under the now familiar
pretext of legislative investigations and that it is time that it was under-
stood that courts and grand juries are the only inquisition into crime in this
country. I do not recognize the doctrine that Congress is the grand inquest
of the nation, or has any such function to perform nor that it can by the
name of a report slander the citizen so as to protect the newspaper which
publishes such slander." Quoted from Fairman, Mr. Justice Miller and the
Supreme Court, at p. 332 (1939).
is273 U.S. 135 (1927).
17 Justice Van Devanter, speaking for a unanimous courf, felt that the subject of
the inquiry, the administration of the Justice Department under Attorney
General Daugherty, was plainly "one on which legislation could be had and
would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was
calculated to elicit." 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1926).
18 See note 12.
19 One of the elements of the crime is that the question which the witness
refused to answer must be "pertinent to the question under inquiry." 2 U.S.C.
§192.
[Vol. 43
FIRST AMENDMENT
including limitations, had been fairly well established by practice, cus-
tom and judicial review prior to World War II.
NEW TYPE OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY
The most recent controversy over the conduct and practices of in-
vestigating committees arises essentially from a new type of inquiry
that has emerged in the post war period.2 0 Of the several factors that
contributed to the uniqueness of this phase of congressional activity,
the most important was the matter under investigation. Previously con-
gressmen had concerned themselves with instances of mismanagement
in the executive departments or an occasional attempt at bribery or
some other form of corrupt practice. However, many of the recent
inquiries have centered around the threat to the security of the United
States government posed by communists, their dupes and fellow trav-
ellers.21 Congressional investigators, in addition to seeking out simple
criminal action or malfeasance in office, began probing political motiva-
tion in an effort to establish a relationship between witnesses and the
threat to national security. This type of inquiry produced a conflict
between the recognized power of Congress to investigate and the
claims of witnesses to the protection of the First and Fifth Amend-
ments of the Constitution.
The conflict of interest inherent in this type of investigation was
made even more acute by the circumstances attending this phase of
congressional activity. The public was in a highly agitated state over
the fear of internal subversion and the reasonable conclusion that there
was a connection between the activities of domestic communists and
the goals of the Soviet Union. Consequently, there was, on one hand,
extensive public support for the efforts of congressmen to ferret out
persons with questionable political associations, while on the other,
there was an adverse reaction to the witness who questioned, perhaps
legitimately, the authority and methods of the investigation.
Congressional committees, competing as they must with the execu-
tive for the attention of the public, found in the investigation of sub-
versive activities an unusual opportunity to make an impact on the
American people.22 Under the circumstances, it is understandable that
some congressmen pursued their quest with great vigor and with little
sympathy for the counter claims of individual witnesses. At the same
time, congressmen discovered that they had at their disposal the vast
resources of the press, radio, and television. Consequently, the threat
2o This new phase of investigation began with the establishment of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities in 1938 under the Chairmanship of
Martin Dies, although the most spectacular investigations of the Committee
occurred after it was elevated to the status of a standing committee in 1946.
21 See Chief justice Warren's comment in Watldns v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957).
2265 Yale L. J. 1159, 1161 (1956).
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to the witness' interest in privacy and his reputation was dramatically
increased by the availability of mass communication, coupled with the
disposition of both congressmen and newsmen to seize upon sensa-
tional disclosures.
Another characteristic of the new phase was that congressional
committees dealing with subversive activities shifted from the tra-
ditional objection of investigating for a legislative purpose to that of
exposing persons with unorthodox political views. 23 Representative
Dies, the first chairman of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities, reflected this objective when he declared, "I am not in a
position to say whether we can legislate effectively in reference to this
matter, but I do know that exposure in a democracy of subversive
activities is the most effective weapon we have in our possession."24
Professor Carr has pointed out that relatively little legislation emerged
from the many inquiries conducted by that committee25 and that much
of the legislation that was passed came from other sources.
Holding witnesses up to public scorn for no particular legislative
purpose presents, in itself, serious constitutional questions which be-
come more urgent in light of the scope of congressional interest. In
addition to inquiries into alleged disloyal and other questionable per-
sons in government service and defense plants, congressional commit-
tees probed institutions of higher learning,26 the movie industry27 the
press and other media and even religious institutions.2s By the early
nineteen-fifties, the old dictum that Congress had no general power
of investigation seemed to have little meaning.
It should be noted that the new elements in congressional investi-
gations are primarily associated with the House Committee on Un-
American Activities and the Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Senate Committee on Government Operations.2 9 Recognition of these
new departures in legislative investigations in no way calls into question
the authority of Congress to inquire into subversive activities, whether
communist or otherwise. The point is that these developments raise
questions that warrant the attention of students of constitutional law.
23 judge Clark dissenting in United States v. Josephson declared that the House
Committee on Un-American Activities "has claimed for itself the function of
a grand jury to focus the spotlight of publicity on those it considers subver-
sive, in order to drive them from their jobs in private and government em-
ployment and their offices in the trade unions." 165 F. 2d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 1947).
24 83 Congressional Record.
25 Carr, supra note 1 at 462.
2rHearings regarding Communist Infiltration at Radiation Laboratory and
Atomic Bomb Project at the University of California, Berkeley, California,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
27 Hearings regarding the Communist Infiltration of the Motion Picture Industry,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
28 For House Committee on Un-American Activities reports entitled Comntunism
and Religion and Communism and Education, see House Document No. 136,
82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).29 Pritchett, The American Constitution at 193 (1959).
[Vol. 43
FIRST AMENDMENT
EMERGENCE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE
Since the basic authority of Congress to investigate had been clari-
fied in the McGrain and Sinclair cases in the nineteen-twenties, the
post war litigation tended to evolve around the question whether or
not the Bill of Rights provided any restraints on that power.30 What
protection, if any, did the Constitution afford witnesses called before
investigating committees?
It is now clear that at least some of the procedural protections in
the Bill of Rights are available to witnesses. The Supreme Court has
said that the Fourth Amendment provision against "unreasonable
search and seizure" is as binding upon congressional committees as it
is on law enforcement officers,3' although there has never been a case
that turned on that point. Perhaps the most widely known provision
available to witnesses is the protection against self-incrimination con-
tained in the Fifth Amendment. Despite some early doubts, the privi-
lege against self-incrimination was sustained in numerous cases on the
lower levels, and, in 1950, the Supreme Court added its confirmation
in Blau v. United States with later amplification in the Emspak and
Quinn cases. 32
Although the Fifth Amendment privilege is an important pro-
cedural protection for witnesses, its effectiveness is limited. One factor
that detracts from the utility of the privilege is the popular impression
that pleading the Fifth Amendment constitutes a confession of guilt.
So great is the stigma associated with pleading the "Fifth" that the
Supreme Court was sympathetic with two witnesses who sought the
benefits of the privilege without appearing to rely on the Amendment.33
Persons who wish to avail themselves of the protections of the Fifth
Amendment must weigh carefully the possible consequences of their
decision.
A more important factor is that the Fifth Amendment, inherently,
provides a very limited range of protection. Consider the witness who
30 In the Watkins case, Chief Justice Warren noted, "In the more recent cases,
the emphasis shifted to problems of accommodating the interest of the Gov-
ernment with the rights and privileges of individuals. The central theme was
the application of the Bill of Rights as a restraint upon the assertion of gov-
ernmental power in this form." 354 U.S. 178, 195 (1957).
31 In a sweeping statement, Chief Justice Warren declared, "The Bill of Rights
is applicable to investigations as to all forms of governmental action. Witnesses
cannot be compelled to give evidence against themselves. They cannot be
subjected to unreasonable search and seizure. Nor can the First Amendment
freedoms of speech, press, religion, or political belief and association be
abridged." Id. at 188.
32 Blau v. United States 340 U.S. 159 (1950); Emspak v. United States, 349
U.S. 190 (1955) ; Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).33 Chief Justice Warren wrote in the Emspak case, "No ritualistic formula or
talismanic phrase is essential in order to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination. All that is necessary is an objection stated in language that a
committee may reasonably be expected to understand as an attempt to invoke
the privilege." 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1954).
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is asked to reveal political affiliation. If he is a communist and chooses
not to respond, he can rely on the Fifth Amendment, especially since
the conviction of Eugene Dennis, et al., in 1951.3 But what of the wit-
ness who does not belong to the Communist party, yet wishes not to
reveal his political activities? Technically, the Fifth Amendment is not
available to him, although he can plead it and suffer the consequences
in terms of social ostracism and possible loss of employment. Or he
can refuse to answer and run the risk of prosecution for contempt of
Congress. These are unhappy alternatives. This was essentially the
dilemma that Paul Sweezy faced. In responding to the Attorney Gen-
eral of New Hampshire, he declared that he was not a member of the
Communist party, yet he refused to answer several questions about his
political activities because he felt that the inquiry infringed on personal
rights protected by the Constitution.
3 5
Many witnesses called before investigating committees were con-
fronted with much the same problem when they were asked to reveal
their attitudes toward such matters as recognition of "Red China," the
Spanish Revolution, and the fate of Ezra Pound, or to disclose the
identity of persons with whom they had associated.3 6 In most instances,
the answers to these questions would not tend to incriminate, therefore
the Fifth Amendment would not be available. Nevertheless, there were
objections to this type of inquiry because it infringed on deeply held
values of freedom of conscience, expression and association as well as
3 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
35 From a prepared statement, Sweezy set forth his position. "Those called to
testify before this and other similar investigations can be classified in three
categories.
"First there are Communists and those who have reason to believe that
even if they are not Communists they have been accused of being and are in
danger of harassment and prosecution.
"Second, there are those who approve of the purposes and methods of
these investigations.
"Third, there are those who are not Communists and do not believe
they are in danger of being prosecuted, but who yet deeply disapprove of
the purposes and methods of these investigations."
Sweezy associated himself with the third group, then went on to consider
the courses open to persons in this category.
"He can claim the privilege not to be a witness against himself and thus
avoid a hateful inquisition. I respect the decision of those who elect to take
this course. My own reason for rejecting it is that, with public opinion in
its present state, the exercise of the privilege is almost certain to be widely
misinterpreted.
"Alternatively, the witness can seek to uphold his principles and main-
tain his integrity, not by claiming the protection of the Fifth Amendment
. but by contesting the legitimacy of offensive questions on other con-
stitutional and legal grounds.' Quoted from a quote in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 239 (1957).
36 For an example of this type of inquiry see the interrogation of Arthur Miller
by the House Committee on Un-American Activities in an investigation of the
unauthorized use of United States Passports held in 1956. Hearings before
the Committee on Un-American Activities House of Representatives, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
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privacy of belief and opinion. Yet what were the rights of witnesses
beyond the privilege against self-incrimination?
Many persons refused to respond to this type of questioning on
grounds that their rights under the First Amendment were violated.37
It was claimed that this Amendment constituted a bar to inquiries that
pried into an individual's speech, associational, and political activities
in much the same manner that the Fifth Amendment established a
privilege against self-incrimination. Dean Griswold of Harvard Law
School notes that in a number of cases where only the Fifth Amend-
ment has been claimed, "the underlying reason, and perhaps the sound
reason, is more closely connected with the First Amendment than with
the Fifth. .".,3 Frequently, witnesses would appeal to both pro-
visions.3 9
As Chief Justice Warren noted, the contention that rights under the
First Amendment were violated by investigating committees raised
questions far more complex than those related to the claim of privilege
against self-incrimination. There was first the question whether the
Amendment was applicable to congressional investigation. The opening
phrase, "Congress shall make no law . .. ," seems to suggest that the
Amendment was intended as a restriction on legislation that might in-
fringe on designated freedoms. Could the limitations thus established
on legislation be expanded to include the investigatory function? Or
accepting the applicability of the First Amendment, could a simple
inquiry, even under the threat of punishment for perjury or contempt,
constitute an infringement on freedoms of speech, religion, press or
assembly? If these propositions were upheld, there would remain a
delicate problem of practical application. Freedoms under the First
Amendment have never been regarded as absolutes, and since the tra-
ditional "clear and present danger" test seems to be of little value in
this context, some new standard or procedure would have to be devised
to distinguish the permissible infringements from those that should be
barred. The appeal of witnesses to the First Amendment did, indeed,
present the judiciary with novel questions on the appropriate limits of
the investigatory power of Congress.
SOME EARLY CASES INVOLVING AN APPEAL
TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The issue first came to the notice of the judiciary in United States
31Among the witnesses who cited the First Amendment either directly or
indirectly were Barsky, Josephson, Sweezy, Lawson, Trumbo, Peck, Sacher,
Knowles, Barenblatt and O'Connor.
38 Griswold, supra note 1 at 61.
39 For example, in response to inquiries concerning his associates, witness Emspak
declared, "I don't think a committee like this or any subcommittee has a right
to go into any question of my beliefs, my associations.. . ." His grounds were
"primarily the First Amendment, supplemented by the Fifth." Hearings before
1960]
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v. Josephson,40 a case growing out of an investigation into the Eisler
affair4" in 1946 conducted by the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. Josephson, who refused to be sworn or to answer questions,
challenged the authority of the Committee, claiming that an inquiry
into his speech and political activities violated rights protected by the
First Amendment. A circuit court of appeals upheld the contempt con-
viction on grounds that a person who refused to be sworn had no
standing to challenge the authority of the investigating body. In refer-
ence to the First Amendment claim, the majority was of the opinion
that:
The power of Congress to gather facts of the most intense public
concern, such as these, is not diminished by the unchallenged
right of individuals to speak their minds within lawful limits.
In addition, the court emphatically declared that when "speech, or
propaganda, or whatever it may at the moment be called, clearly pre-
sents an immediate danger to national security, the protection of the
First Amendment ceases. '4 2
The issue was under consideration again in United States v.
Barsky,43 the leading case in the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee investiga-
tion of 1946." Here a different court of appeals granted the possibility
that First Amendment freedoms were being infringed, but held that
the investigation was justified by an overriding public interest.
In both of these cases the court was divided and in each instance
a vigorous dissent was registered. Judge Clark of the Second Cir-
cuit, dissenting in the Josephson case, believed that the authorizing
resolution of the House Committee on Un-American Activities was so
vague as to be defective.45 Furthermore, he declared:
We may pass beyond the defect to face the major issue whether
or not an authorization so broad is compatible with the First
Amendment. I think we can say without reservation of any
kind that, had legislation been actually formulated in the exact
terms of the authorization quoted, its unconstitutionality would
have been conceded. 46
the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives. 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
40 165 F. 2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947) ; cert. denied 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
41 Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on Gerhart
Eisler, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) ; and Hearings before the House Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities on Investigation of Un-American Propaganda
Activities in the United States (regarding Leon Josephson and Samnuel
Liptzen), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
42 165 F. 2d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1947).
43 167 F. 2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
44 Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
5 Nine years later, in Watkins v. United States, the Supreme Court agreed
with Judge Clark on the questionable nature of the authorizing resolution
for the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
46 United States v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82, 97 (2d Cir. 1947).
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Judge Edgerton of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
summed up his objections to the conviction of Barsky by stating:
In my opinion the House Committee's investigation abridges
freedom of speech and inflicts punishment without trial; and the
statute the appellants are convicted of violating provides no
ascertainable standard of guilt47
In these dissents we find the initial examples of judicial willingness to
view certain types of congressional inquiries as violative of the First
Amendment.
By 1948, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, al-
though it had ruled against the witness, had acknowledged his con-
tention that First Amendment freedoms were being infringed by con-
gressional inquiries into speech and political activities, while in the
Second Circuit the existence of such a claim was denied. This would
seem to have been an appropriate time for a ruling from the Supreme
Court, but certiorari was denied in both instances. At this point there
was little reason for optimism on the part of witnesses who had relied
on the First Amendment as a defense against charges of contempt of
Congress. Courts followed the precedents established in the foregoing
cases, and with only one limited exception, ignored or disallowed
claims based on the First Amendment. 3
The one exception relates to the case of Rumely v. United States49
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1952. This case
had developed from the efforts of a congressional committee, as a
part of a general investigation into lobbying, to inquire into the activi-
ties of Edward A. Rumely, the Executive Secretary of the Committee
on Constitutional Government. In an attempt to ascertain the financial
basis of this group, congressional investigators had asked Rumely to
reveal the names of persons who had purchased large quantities of
publications from his organization. He refused to disclose the informa-
tion and was cited for contempt of Congress.
The court of appeals interpreted the congressional committee's
mandate to investigate "lobbying" to mean only direct contact with
congressmen; consequently inquiries concerning Rumely's relations
with third parties was beyond the authority of the inquiring committee.
However, Judge Prettyman, joining Judge Edgerton, went on to de-
clare, "On a record such as this, so slim a semblance of pertinency is
47 United States v. Barsky, 167 F. 2d 241, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
48 The following are among the cases where courts have refused to recognize the
First Amendment as a limitation on the power of Congress to investigate.
Marshall v. United States, 176 F. 2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; Lawson v. United
States, 176 F. 2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Eisler v. United States, 170 F. 2d
273 (D.C. Cir. 1948); United States v. Sacher, 139 F. Supp. 855 (D.D.C.
1956) ; United States v. Kamlin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D.C. Mass. 1956) ; United
States v. O'Connor, 135 F. Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1955) ; United States v. Yukio
Abe, 95 F. Supp. 991 (D.C. Hawaii 1950).
49 197 F. 2d 166 (9th Cir. 1952).
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not enough to justify inquisition violative of the First Amendment."5
This same judge wrote the opinion in the decision that sent Barsky to
prison. He distinguished the Rumely case from Barsky by indicating
that in the latter:
... it was shown that the President and other responsible Gov-
ernment officials had . . . represented to the Congress that Com-
munism and the Communists are, in the current world situation,
potential threats to the security of the country. For that reason,
and that reason alone we held that Congress had the power, and
the duty, to inquire into Communism and the Communists.51
Judge Prettyman thought the First Amendment was involved in both
cases. In one instance infringement was justified by the "potential
threats to the security of the country" while the Rumely case lacked
such urgency; consequently, protected freedoms could be honored.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court sustained Rumely in his fight
against charges of contempt,52 although the majority avoided the First
Amendment issue by simply holding that questions put to the witnesses
were not within the scope of the authorizing resolution. However, Jus-
tices Douglas and Black thought the questions were relevant, and in
separate opinions, they expressed their readiness to meet the con-
stitutional issue by holding that Congress had no authority to make
the inquiry since it had infringed on protected freedoms.
5 3
By 1953, four distinguished jurists, Edgerton, Prettyman, Douglas
and Black thought the First Amendment should be interpreted to pro-
vide some restraint on the investigatory power of Congress.
ATTITUDE OF THE WARREN COURT-1957
Although there had been opportunity for review," it was not until
50 Id. at 172.
51 Id. at 173.
52 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, did note possible infringement
on protected freedoms. "Surely," he declared, "it cannot be denied that giving
the scope to the resolution for which the Government contends, that is deriv-
ing from it the power to inquire into all efforts of private individuals to
influence public opinion through books and periodicals, however remote the
radiations of influence which they may exert upon the ultimate legislative
process, raises doubts of constitutionality in view of the prohibition of the
First Amendment." United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953).
53 Justice Douglas wrote: "If the present inquiry were sanctioned, the press
would be subjected to harassment that in practical effort might be as serious
as censorship. A publisher, compelled to register with the federal government,
would be subjected to vexatious inquiries. A requirement that a publisher
disclose the identity of those who buy his books, pamphlets, or papers is
indeed the beginning of of surveillance of the press. True, no legal sanction
is involved here. Congress has imposed no tax, established no board of
censors, instituted no licensing system. But the potential restraint is equally
severe. The finger of government levelled against the press is ominous. Once
the government can demand of a publisher the names of the purchaser of his
publications, the free press as we know it disappears." United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 57 (1953).
54 The Supreme Court avoided the First Amendment Question in Emspak v.
United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
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June of 1957 that the Supreme Court again considered the relation of
the First Amendment claim to congressional investigations. In the
Watkins case, the plaintiff had been summoned before a subcommittee
of the House Committee on Un-American Activities in connection with
the 1954 investigation of communist infiltration into labor unions. 5
Watkins talked freely about his past activities, admitting that he had
worked closely with the Communist party and had supported some of
its activities; but he denied being a member and cited instances where
he had opposed the communists. By all accounts, he was a courteous
and cooperative witness and encountered no difficulty until counsel
for the Subcommittee read certain names from a list and asked Watkins
to identify them and indicate whether they had been associated with
communist activities.
At this point the witness read a prepared statement as follows:
I will answer any question which this committee puts to me
about myself. I will also answer questions about those persons
whom I know to be members of the Communist party and whom
I believe still are. I will not, however, answer any questions with
respect to others with whom I associated in the past."
Watkins, attended by counsel, stated specifically that he was not relying
on the Fifth Amendment; instead, he based his refusal to answer on
the grounds that the questions were "outside the proper scope of (the)
committee's activities" and that the committee had no "right to under-
take the public exposure of persons because of their past activities."
57
This answer proved unacceptable and the witness was subsequently
cited for contempt of Congress.
Watkins' conviction was at first reversed by a division of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, but upon a motion for a re-
hearing en banc, the conviction was sustained by a six to two vote
with Chief judge Edgerton and Judge Bazelon, who had constituted
the majority in the first instance, turning in dissents.58 From this action
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Later, by a six to one decision
with Chief Justice Warren writing for the majority and Justice Clark
entering a dissent, the court of appeals was reversed and the case re-
manded with instruction to dismiss the indictment.
The specific basis for the decision in the Watkins case was that the
witness had been denied due process of law. According to Chief Justice
Warren, the authorizing resolution of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities was so vague and the other methods for determin-
5 Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of
Representatives, (Investigations of Communist Activities in the Chicago Area,
Part 3). 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
56 Id. at 4275.
57 Ibid.
58 Watkins v. United States, 233 F. 2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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ing the "subject under inquiry" so inadequate that the witness could
not judge whether the questions were pertinent or not. Consequently
the petitioner "was ... not accorded a fair opportunity to determine
whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer, and his con-
viction is necessarily invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."' 9 In a companion case, much the same defect was fatal
to the efforts of New Hampshire to punish Professor Paul Sweezy
for refusing to answer questions posed by the Attorney General in
behalf of the state legislature. The Court ruled that:
The lack of any indications that the legislature wanted the in-
formation the Attorney General attempted to elicit from peti-
tioner must be treated as the absence of authority.6
0
It followed that the prosecution of Sweezy violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the decisions in the above cases related, in part, to pro-
cedural guarantees, the Court was also faced with the question whether
the investigations had infringed on rights protected by the First Amend-
ment. Both witnesses had invoked that constitutional provision at some
stage in the proceedings. At the time of the inquiry, Sweezy declared,
"I shall resepectfully decline to answer questions concerning ideas,
beliefs, and associations which ... seem to me to invade the freedoms
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
S. .,,6 Watkins, on the other hand, did not invoke the Amendment at
the hearing, but he did so upon appeal. In his brief, it was argued that
"compelled disclosures sought by the committee abridge rights pro-
tected by the First Amendment" and that the Committee could not
"constitutionally require petitioner to reveal past political affiliations of
his one-time associates. 62
Significantly, the Court took the occasion to answer at least some
of the questions raised by the First Amendment claim. Any lingering
doubts as to the applicability of that provision to congressional investi-
gations should be dispelled. "Clearly," wrote Chief Justice Warren,
''an investigation is subject to the command that Congress shall make
no law abridging freedom of speech or press or assembly." 63 He also
noted that "While it is true that there is no statute to be reviewed, and
that an investigation is not a law, nevertheless an investigaion is part
of law making." Furthermore, the Court recognized that an inquiry
may constitute a restraint on protected freedoms. "The mere summon-
ing of a witness and compelling him to testify, against his will, about
his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of governmental
59 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 215 (1957).
60 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254 (1957).
61 Quoted from a note at 354 U.S. 234, 242 (1957).
62 Brief for petitioner, p .19, Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
63 Watkins v. United States, 254 U.S. 178, 197 (1957).
[Vol. 43
FIRST AMENDMENT
interference. '64 While the encroachment in particular instances might
be very slight, the cumulative effect of wide-spread inquisitorial activ-
ity could easily lead to substantial infringement of individual rights.
Also, the Court felt that there was a particular hazard in subjecting
a witness to public scorn and loss of prestige for beliefs and associa-
tions entertained a quarter of a century ago which, in the eyes of the
public, would be judged by contemporary standards. The fact that in
many instances the greater part of the penalty leveled against the re-
calcitrant witness may be in the form of social pressures or ostracism
inflicted by private persons does not relieve Congress of the responsi-
bility of "initiating the reaction.
6 5
While both Justice Warren, for the Court, and Justice Frankfurter,
in a concurring opinion, took the position that the First Amendment
does limit the investigatory power of Congress, they did not suggest
that a valid claim based on that Amendment would prevail in all in-
stances. We are cautioned that although freedom of speech, religion,
press and assembly rank high in our value structure, these values must
be measured against competing demands. Chief Justice Warren noted
that "despite the adverse effects which follow upon compelled dis-
closures of private matters, not all such inquiries are barred." This is
not an unreasonable position although it poses the further difficulty of
distinguishing the permissible encroachments from the one so gross
as to be violative of the First Amendment. In dealing with this prob-
lem, a balance of interest approach was suggested. Against "the in-
terest of Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling wit-
ness," the Court would weigh an "individual's rights to privacy" and
"his liberty of speech, press, religion (and) assembly."66 Justice Frank-
furter expanded upon this approach in his concurring opinion in the
Sweezy case:
To be sure, this is a conclusion based on a judicial judgment in
balancing two contending principles-the right of a citizen to
political privacy, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the right of the State to self-protection. And striking the bal-
ance implies the exercise of judgment. This is the inescapable
judicial task in giving substantive content, legally enforced, to
the Due Process Clause, and it is a task ultimately committed
to this Court.6 7
Note that both Justices seem to anticipate a more active role on the
part of the judiciary in determining the broad outline of the law of
legislative investigations.
641d. at 197.
65 Id. at 198.
66 Id. at 198-199.
67 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266, 267 (1957).
1960]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ATTITUDE OF THE WARREN COURT-1959
Recent decisions seem to indicate a slight shift in the attitude of
the Supreme Court toward the rights of witnesses before investigating
committees. While the shift is not so precipitous as to undercut the
basic orientation toward the First Amendment, the tone of the opinions
and the effect of the rulings show a greater deference toward the
interest of the state in compelling testimony from reluctant witnesses
than was evident in the 1957 cases.
In the Barenblatt case, the petitioner had been called to testify
before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities in connection with the 1954 investigation of communist in-
filtration into educational institutions. Barenblatt, a former instructor
at Vassar College, was asked whether he was or had ever been a mem-
ber of the Communist Party and whether he had belonged to the
Haldane Club during the time he held a fellowship from the Univer-
sity of Michigan. His refusal to respond brought a conviction on a
five count indictment that was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Subsequently, the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals for a rehearing in light of the Watkins
case which had been decided in the interval. A sharply divided Court
of Appeals again sustained the conviction and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
The petitioner argued that his conviction ought to be set aside, first,
on grounds of vagueness in the congressional rule which founded the
parent committee, second, because he had not been sufficiently "ap-
prised of the pertinency" of the questions, and third, because "the
questions petitioner refused to answer infringed rights protected by
the First Amendment."6 8 The arguments that had prevailed for Wat-
kins came to naught for Barenblatt. By a five to four decision, the
conviction was sustained.
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, sought to distinguish this
case from Watkins. On the issue involving vagueness of the authoriza-
tion resolution, which incidentally was the same rule challenged in the
1957 case, Justice Harlan asserted that the defect had been compen-
sated for by the clear statement by the Chairman of the Subcommittee
concerning the authorization and the purpose of the investigation.
Further, on the question of pertinency, the majority felt that in the
context of the investigation the questions posed, unlike those put to
Watkins, were relevant and pertinent to the declared objectives of the
inquiry.
On the constitutional question, the Court accepted the interpretation
of the First Amendment found in the 1957 cases. Justice Harlan wrote,
68 360 U.S. 109, 115, 116 (1959).
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"The precise constitutional issue confronting us is whether the Sub-
committee's inquiry into petitioner's past or present membership in the
Communist Party transgress the provisions of the First Amendment,
which of course reach and limit congressional investigations."8 9 The
Court also accepted the balance of interest concept as a suitable ap-
proach for judging the applicability of the constitutional provisions.
However, in weighing the various elements involved in the Barenblatt
case, the Court concluded "that the balance between the individual and
the governmental interest .. .must be struck in favor of the latter,
and ... therefore the provisions of the First Amendment (had) not
been offended. °7 0 The majority seemed prepared to tip the scales in
favor of the government's interest in investigating communism pro-
vided only that a reasonable relation could be established between the
questioning of Barenblatt and the declared objective of Congress.
Justice Black, who was joined by Justices Warren, Douglas and in
part by Brennan, wrote a vigorous dissent in which he chided the
majority for over subscribing to the government's view that there was
a significant connection between the questioning of the witness and
the fate of the nation. Holding that a witness's constitutional rights
would have to be subordinated to the demands of an investigating
committee even when a valid relationship existed between the ques-
tioning and a legislative objection was an anathema to Justice Black.
He argued that the constitutional rights of a witness ought to prevail
irrespective of the procedural and jurisdictional tidiness of the inves-
tigation.
The main point urged in the dissent was that the conduct of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities and that of the Sub-
committee in question infringed rights protected by the First Amend-
ment' and this was ample basis for reversing the conviction of Baren-
blatt. Devotion to the freedoms of the First Amendment leads Justice
Black to reject the "balance of interest" test supported by the Court in
both the Watkins and Barenblatt cases. Congress simply has no inter-
ests that supersede the freedoms of speech, assembly, press and peti-
tion. But even assuming the balancing process, Justice Black was of
the opinion that the most important element to be weighed had been
ignored. The Court, he charged, "completely leaves out the real in-
terest in Barenblatt's silence, the interest of the people as a whole in
being able to join organizations, advocate causes and make political
'mistakes' without later being subjected to governmental penalties for
having dared to think for themselves."7 1 The dissent in Barenblatt
I
691d. at 126 (1959).
7o1d. at 134.
7 Id. at 144.
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contains the clearest judicial exposition to date on the social interest
involved in legislative investigations.
The appellant in the Uphaus case was the Executive Director of
World Fellowship, Inc., an organization that had conducted programs
of political discussion and recreation in New Hampshire. Some of the
speakers at the sessions were alleged to have been either communist or
affiliated with front organizations. The state's attorney general, acting
as a one man legislative committee under the same authority as that
involved in the Sweezy case, undertook an investigation.7 2 The issue
was joined when Uphaus, who had testified about his own activities,
refused to honor a subpoena duces tecum calling for a list of persons
who had attended the summer sessions of World Fellowship.
To his conviction for civil contempt, Uphaus interposed several
objections. First, he maintained that the ruling in Pennsylvania v.
Nelson7 3 denied the state's jurisdiction over matters relating to
subversion, and second, he argued that the order requiring him to
reveal the names of guests violated rights protected by the First
Amendment.
In sustaining Uphaus' conviction, the Court, speaking through Jus-
tice Clark, ruled that the Nelson decision only barred a state from
prosecuting subversive conduct that was directed against the national
government. The purpose of the Nelson ruling was to prevent a race
to the court house by state and federal officials. Nothing in that de-
cision barred the prosecution of seditious or subversive acts directed
against a state, and even more remote was the notion that the ruling
restricted a state from investigating "subversive persons" which New
Hampshire was purporting to do.
Justice Clark dismissed the First Amendment claim rather sum-
marily by declaring that "academic and political freedom discussed in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire are not present here in the same degree
since World Fellowship is neither a university or a political party. '7 4
Any rights Uphaus might have had under the First Amendment were,
in the opinion of Justice Clark, more than counterbalanced by the
authority of the state to inquire into the operations and membership
of an organization incorporated under New Hampshire law.
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices Black, Douglas and
Warren, expressed the view that the primary purpose of the investiga-
tion was to punish, by exposure to public scorn, persons connected
with the World Fellowship, Inc. This was hardly justification for any
kind of investigation and particularly one that infringed upon speech
and associational activities. Furthermore, Justice Brennan, suggested
72 See supra note 5.
73350 U.S. 497 (1956).
, Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 77 (1959).
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that due to the exposure motive the whole investigation might be re-
garded as an equivalent of a bill of attainder and therefore uncon-
stitutional.
RATIONALE FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM
Before the judiciary can go much farther in interpreting the First
Amendment as a restraint on legislative investigations, some agree-
ment will have to be reached on the theoretical basis for such a holding.
The lack of this orientation is apparent in the groping one detects in
the works of justices, lawyers and laymen who are favorably disposed
to such a claim. Certainly, something more elaborate than the simple
statement that "protected freedoms are infringed" will be needed if
the Supreme Court is to sustain the First Amendment claim where no
defects can be found in the procedure or authorization of investigating
committees.
Some witnesses have inferred that their refusal to respond is based
on a general right to privacy. In a famous article published in 1890,
Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis argued that an individual's
interest in privacy should be protected against intrusions from news-
paper reporters, gossip columnists and photographers.7 5 The idea has
gained the support of many influential scholars76 and has been accepted
in some jurisdictions. However, it may be doubted whether a claim
which might be valid against private parties can be asserted against
a committee of Congress, and there would be further questions about
its association with the First Amendment. Later as an associate justice,
Brandeis wrote that the founding fathers "sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."77 But
even here, he was referring to the Fourth Amendment; not the First.
Consequently, Charles P. Curtis is probably correct when he wrote that
the Supreme Court has never held that the First Amendment includes
a right to privacy.78
One further point needs clarification. Persons who oppose the no-
tion that the First Amendment constitutes some sort of limitation on
the power of Congress to investigate frequently invoke Wigmore's quote
from Lord Hardwicke that "the public is entitled to every man's evi-
dence" as support for their position.7 9 just as frequently, they will
75 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
3 See Faulkner, On Privacy-The American Dreamt: What Happened to It,
211 Harper's Magazine, 33 (1955) ; Pound, Interest of Personality, 28 Harv.
L. Rev. 343 (1915) ; Nitzer, The Riqht of Privacy, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 526 (1941).
77 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), (Dissenting opinion).
7S Curtis, Wringing the Bill of Rights, The Pacific Spectator at 371 (1948).
79 "For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental
maximum that the public... has a right to every man's evidence." 8 WIwleoRE,
EVIDENCE §2192 (3d ed. 1940).
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neglect to point out that this statement was made in relation to ju-
dicial proceedings, and that Wigmore, at least, was firmly of the opinion
that legislatures did not have unlimited power of inquiry.80
Another question related to the claim of privacy is whether or not
freedom of speech, secured by the First Amendment, carries with it
a privilege of' silence. Such an implication might be drawn from the
opinion of Justice Jackson in West Virginia v. Barnette,"' a case de-
cided in 1943. Here the Court viewed the flag salute as related to free-
dom of expression and held that the First Amendment protected the
Jehovah's Witnesses in their refusal to perform the ceremony. Yet this
point of view, suggested at the time the First Amendment registered its
high water mark in the Roosevelt Court, has not been developed in
subsequent litigation. Most authorities would be inclined to agree
with Judge Prettyman's analysis in the Barsky case that while freedom
of speech is justified as a means for arriving at political decisions and
for effecting change in both government personnel and policy, neither
of these considerations supports a claim to silence.8 2
What justification is there, then, for construing the First Amend-
ment as a limitation on the investigatory power of legislatures? This
writer supports the view that certain types of inquiries constitute a
prior restraint on freedom of expression and political association.
"Patently, if it is well known that expressing novel political ideas and
advocating certain types of change in government frequently subject
individuals to burdensome investigation and disparaging publicity, many
persons might be constrained to refrain from such activity."' ' 3 Wide-
spread use of legislative investigations that pry into political expression
and association should be regarded as detrimental to the political
process in a democracy.
That compelled disclosures may constitute a prior restraint upon
political activity and association seems clear. As the petitioner argued
in the Watkins case, "If a union official from Rock Island can be sub-
poenaed in 1954 to disclose the 1944 political membership of his former
associates, fear will take the place of freedom of political association.
S. ., Previously, Justice Douglas had expressed the view in the
Rumely case that once the government, through an investigating corn-
80 However, at sections 2195 under the heading "Officers Possessing Power to
Compel Testimonial Answers." Wigmore notes that due to policy considera-
tions and the fact that legislatures do not proceed according to strict evi-
dential rules, "strict limitations" should be placed on the power of legisla-
tures to compel testimony. Id., §2195. Also see Wigmore's criticism of legisla-
tive inquiries in Legislative Power to Compel Testimonial Disclosures, 19
I11. L. Rev. 452 (1924).
8'319 U.S. 624 (1943).82 Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
83Note Constitutional Limitations on Un-Anerican Activities Committee, 47
Colo. L. Rev. 416, 428. Also see, note The Power of Congress to Investigate
and to Compel Testimony, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 671, 674 (1957).
s Brief for Petitioner, p. 21.
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mittee, can force a publisher to disclose the names of those who sub-
scribe to his material, "The free press as we know it disappears" and
"the imponderable pressures of the orthodox lay hold."85' More recent-
ly, Chief Justice Warren noted that among the evils associated with
compelled disclosure of unpopular views was the "more subtle and
immeasurable effect upon those who tend to adhere to the most ortho-
dox and uncontroversial views and association in order to avoid a
similar fate at some future time."' 8 The grave consequences attending
disclosure of membership in unpopular organizations are well known
to the government employee, the school teacher and the defense worker.
Even persons engaged in purely private pursuits can be adversely af-
fected by such disclosures. It seems quite probable that this state of
affairs tends to make persons more than circumspect in their organi-
zational affiliations, and actually works to restrain expression and action
in the realm of politics.
The importance of freedom of political association was emphasized
by Justice Frankfurter when he wrote that "the inviolability of pri-
vacy belonging to a citizen's political loyalties has so overwhelming
an importance to the well-being of our kind of society that it cannot
be constitutionally encroached upon on the basis of so meager a coun-
tervailing interest '8 7 as that presented by New Hampshire. Nor is this
a newly discovered value, for over a century ago De Tocqueville ex-
pressed the view that:
The most natural privilege of man next to the right of acting for
himself is that of combining his exertions with those of his
fellow creatures and of acting in common with them. I am there-
fore led to conclude that the right of association is almost as
inalienable as the right of personal liberty. No legislator can
attack it without impairing the very foundations of society.~S
Indeed, the freedom to affiliate and to act through groups composed of
persons of like interests is one of the most viable elements in our
political system and any infringement thereon must be carefully
weighed.
It follows, then, that the availability of the First Amendment as
a bar against certain types of inquiries should be regarded as more
than a constitutional right of the witness, for, as Justice Black pointed
out in his Barenblatt dissent, society has an interest in preserving the
integrity and the vitality of the political process. Mr. Alexander Meikle-
john had this social interest in mind when he asserted that in the area
of public discussion, the First Amendment:
... is not, in the first instance, concerned with the right of the
85 345 U.S. 41, 57 (1953).
86 Watkins v. United States 354 U.S. 178, 197, 198 (1957).
87 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266 (1957).
88 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America at 196 (Bradley rev. 1945).
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speaker to say this or that. It is concerned with the authority of
the hearers to meet together, to discuss, and to hear discussed
by speakers of their own choice, whatever they may deem worthy
of their consideration. 9
From this social interest position one can counter the criticism made
by Justice Clark in the Watkins case90 that the petitioner was seeking
to vindicate, not his own, but the rights of others. Apart from whatever
rights Watkins and those he sought to protect might have had, the
crux of the matter is that if the interrogation infringed on freedoms
essential to the political process, society had an interest in the inquiry
that Congress and the judiciary are bound to respect.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional rights are seldom devised to meet imagined or fancied
wrongs; they are normally developed as a response to actual practices
and policies which a dominant segment of the community feels are
reprehensible. The cold war with its tensions and anxieties which drove
the nation to view with grave concern any unorthodox beliefs and
behavior and to countenance restrictions and limitations on individual
freedom on a scale unknown in previous periods of American history
may have been the matrix for new constitutional developments. It is
hoped that a substantial number of Americans may now be able to
look back on recent events with a degree of detachment to permit a
balanced assessment of the clash of interest between investigating com-
mittee and the rights of witnesses. At the very least we should attempt
to view the problem in its proper perspective. In time of national
crisis, the issue is likely to be represented as a choice between the se-
curity of the nation on one hand the rights of a few people on the
other. If this were the correct analysis, there would be no choice at
all. But it is submitted that the Nation's security rests on many com-
plex factors, most of which are far removed from the investigatory
power of Congress. Consequently, the factors in the equation are still
the traditional interest of the Government in information as weighed
against both the constitutional rights of witnesses and the interest of
society in maintaining the viability of the political process.
From the heat and bitterness of actual investigation, witnesses have
appealed to the protection of the Constitution and have presented to
the judiciary questions involving an interpretation of such traditional
values as freedom of expression and association. The Supreme Court
&9 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee
on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1955), p. 11.
OJustice Clark maintained, in dissent, that Watkins "was actually seeking to
... protect his former associates, not himself, from embarrassment. He had
already admitted his own involvement. He sought to vindicate the rights, if
any, of his associates. It is settled that one cannot invoke the constitutional
rights of another." 354 U.S. 178, 231 (1957).
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has responded by stating that the restrictions of the First Amendment
are binding upon legislative committees, and by holding that certain
inquiries may constitute an infringement on protected freedoms. (It
should be noted that the strictures of the First Amendment apply with
equal force to state legislatures.) 91 Further, when protected freedoms
are involved, the Court has indicated that it would review the proce-
dure and authorization of the inquiring committee with great care. How-
ever, the basic constitutional question of whether the First Amendment
constitutes a limitation on the power of legislatures to compel disclos-
ures even where there are no authorization or procedural defects has
not been answered by the Supreme Court.
It seems probable that this question will be presented in due course.
Since constitutionally protected liberties ought to have a standing in
their own right that may counterbalance the power of Congress quite
apart from any technical defect in the action of the legislature or its
committees, this writer is of the opinion that the Court should hold
that the First Amendment does constitute such a restraint. The limita-
tion could take the form of a presumption that all compelled dis-
closures of political beliefs, actions, and associations, whether legal or
otherwise, are barred, unless the government can show a direct and
compelling relation between the information sought and some substan-
tial interest that Congress can protect. Admittedly this formulation does
not embody the preciseness of an algebraic equation, but it does provide
a point of departure, identifies the values to consider and suggests
a method of establishing their relative merits. Adding the interest of
society in maintaining the vitality of the poiltical process to the
interest of the individual witness in protected rights would seem enough
to justify the limited presumption in favor of the First Amendment.
The Court might also take the position that among the elements
necessary to establish the direct and compelling relation between the
information sought and a substantial interest that Congress can pro-
tect is a showing that the information was not available to the investi-
gators from any other reasonable source. It has been clearly established
that in many instances where Congress has cited a witness for con-
tempt, the information sought was either in the hands of the inquiring
committee or it was of such a trivial nature that it could have had no
possible relevance to the ability of Congress to legislate. In the case
of John Watkins, the identity and the political affiliations of the
persons he refused ot comment upon were known to the committee.
The judiciary might also attempt to establish categories of questions
9 1 In N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), Justice Harlan declared,
"It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advance-
ment of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech."
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that are presumed to fall within the protection of the First Amendment,
thus putting the witness and the investigators on notice that when such
inquiries are made the relation to a substantial interest must be clearly
indicated. A precedent along this order may be seen in the relation
between the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
the inquiry concerning communist affiliations.
Finally, it must be noted that the expanded role of the judiciary does
not relieve Congress of the ultimate responsibliity for supervising its
investigating committees. Nevertheless, the judiciary can provide some
protection for witnesses and the introduction of the First Amendment
as a possible bar to certain types of inquiries could be an important
addition to the law of legislative investigations.
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